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Abstract This paper explores the potential of using the Moran’s I statistic to detect
complementary bidding on public contracts. The test is applied to data concerning the
so-called Swedish asphalt cartel, which was discovered in 2001. Using information on
submitted bids and procurement characteristics for both the cartel period (1995–2001)
and the post-cartel period (2003–2009), the Moran’s I correctly predicts complemen-
tary bidding behavior for linear and quadratic specifications when such behavior is
likely to exist, and rejects such behavior when it’s unlikely to be present. Remarkably,
the Moran’s I also correctly indicates and rejects complementary bidding on the basis
of information on the separate bids alone.
Keywords Antitrust · Auction · Cartel and collusion · Complementary bidding ·
Public procurement · Spatial econometrics
JEL Classification D44 · H57 · L10 · L40
1 Introduction
Thedetectionof cartels and collusive biddingbehavior for public contracts has received
increasing attention in the economics literature during recent decades, see Bajari and
Summers (2002) and Harrington (2008). One reason for this is that competition lies at
the very core of economics.Another reason is that cartels and collusive behavior among
firms lead to higher prices, which is bad for private consumers and makes the issue of
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cartel detection highly relevant from a policy perspective. For instance Connor (2004)
found the median increase in price attributable to collusion to be around 25 %. Even
though cartels and collusive bidding behavior are illegal, they exist and attempts to
coordinate price-setting and production volumes are often effective. Antitrust author-
ities (and sometimes competing firms and private consumers) do their best to find and
report suspicious behavior, but cartels are often difficult to detect. Harrington (2008)
suggests that one should start by looking at markets characterized by few rivals and
homogenous products, but there are many markets with exactly those characteristics.
Other indicators to look for are suspicious patterns of behavior such as direct evi-
dence of communication via illicit meetings and messages, or patterns in prices and
quantities that indirectly reveal collusion.
This study lies within the last of these traditions, which Harrington further divides
into tests based on four questions: 1. Does the actual behavior differ significantly from
that which should follow from competitive behavior? 2. Is there a structural break in
behavior that could, for example, mark the formation or demise of a cartel? 3. Does
the behavior of a set of firms that are suspected to have formed a cartel differ from
that of other firms? 4. Does a collusion model better describe the available data than
a competitive model? The method described herein is based on the third kind.
The main purpose of this paper is to illustrate how theMoran’s I test statistic can be
used to test for potential collusive bidding behavior (complementary bidding among
cartel members) on public contracts. The test builds on the work of Moran (1948) and
was generalized byCliff andOrd (1972) in order to derive a test for spatial correlation in
linear regressionmodels; it has since become probably themost frequently used test for
spatial correlation.1 The main advantage of the proposed method lies in its simplicity
and comparativelymodest data requirements, whichmake it suitable for use by organi-
zations such as antitrust authorities as a fairly simpleway of screening large numbers of
different markets and procurements for potentially suspicious bidding behavior.2 It’s
low data requirement is of importance as the collection of complementary information
(besides the separate bids) from procurements is costly, time consuming and in some
cases almost impossible.3 The test is applied to data relating to the so-called Swedish
asphalt cartel, which was detected in 2001, and the analysis presented here comple-
ments that of Bergman et al. (2015), who apply a spatial lag regression approach on the
same data set to verify the cartel’s existence.4 It should be noted that while methods
1 Burridge (1980) demonstrated that the Moran’s I test statistic is equivalent to a Lagrange multiplier
test statistic derived from a linear regression model without a spatial lag. Its large sample properties and
asymptotics have been analyzed by Pinkse (1999) and Keleijan and Prucha (2001). See also Anselin (1988,
chapter 8). For an introduction to spatial econometrics in general, see the seminal work of Anselin (1988).
2 Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) propose an alternative screening method based on price movements before
and after the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. Using a data set covering the retail gasoline industry
in Louisville, U.S.A., they found that the average price decreased by 16 % after the collapse, while the
standard deviation of the prices increased by over 200 %.
3 An ideal method would enable cartel detection based on the bids alone.
4 Heijnen et al. (2015) also use spatial econometric tools to screen for local cartels. In their analysis of
the Dutch gasoline market, they provide an algorithm to find the most suspicious cluster of outlets using
the geographical distance between gasoline stations as a measure of closeness. Hence, their spatial weights
matrix (and the connectedness) is based on geographical distance. Here, the “spatial” weights matrix, or
bidding matrix, is based on connections within the bidding space, which is explained in Sect. 2.2 below.
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such as those proposed herein can be used to obtain evidence suggestive of collusion
or cartel activity, we would be the first to acknowledge that additional evidence and
other forms of proof would be required to support any kind of legal action.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: a brief review of the asphalt cartel’s
history along with a description of the data set used and the Moran’s I statistic are
given in Sect. 2. This section also contains the very important definition of the elements
of the spatial weights matrix.6 The results are presented and discussed in Sect. 3, and
concluding comments are given in the final section.
2 The data and Moran’s I
2.1 The data
As the entity responsible for the Swedish road transport system, including road build-
ing, operation andmaintenance, the Swedish RoadAdministration (SRA) is a frequent
buyer of road pavement and pavement repair services. Following the general princi-
ples for public procurement within the EU, it allocates its contracts using competitive
bidding, typically in the form of first-price sealed-bid auctions. During the period for
which we have data (1995–2009), the SRA was organized into seven autonomous
districts, each of which was responsible for road maintenance and for organizing pro-
curement auctions relating to road maintenance activities within its geographical area
of responsibility. The districts’ responsibilities included designing calls for tenders,
specifying the conditions of the auctions, drawing up the contracts, and evaluating the
bids.7
On October 24, 2001, the Swedish Competition Authority (SCA) conducted unan-
nounced raids on a number of companies in the Swedish asphalt paving industry.
The purpose of these raids, which continued for two days, was to find documents that
could verify suspicions of illegal collusive bidding on public contracts, including com-
munications between the firms. The resulting trials at the Stockholm District Court
lasted over 40 days. In 2003, nine firms were convicted of collusive bidding. The con-
victed firms appealed against the decision at the Market Court, which confirmed the
District Court’s decision. On July 10, 2007, the court ordered the nine companies to
pay over e133 million in fines. Documentation provided by the SCA (2009) suggests
that the cartel began operating in 1993 and that non-winning firms were compensated
for not bidding or for submitting fake bids, i.e. engaging in complementary bidding.
5 See Baker and Bresnahan (2008), Harrington (2008), and Abrantes-Metz and Bajari (2009) for a discus-
sion of why econometric evidence must be accompanied by additional evidence and other kinds of proof
to be usable in court. This is also discussed by Heijnen et al. (2015).
6 As pointed out by one referee, a more appropriate name in our context would be a bidding matrix.
7 The seven autonomous districts were the North (encompassing the counties of Norrbotten and Västerbot-
ten), Middle (the counties of Jämtland, V ästernorrland, Gävleborg, and Dalarna), Stockholm (the counties
of Stockholm andGotland), Mälardalen (the counties of Uppsala, Vä stmanland, Södermanland, Örebro and
Östergötland), West (the counties of Värmland, Västra Götaland and Halland), and Southeast (the counties
of Skåne, Blekinge, Kalmar, Kronoberg, and Jönköping).
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The definition of the elements in the bidding matrix defined below is based on this
information.8
The data set used in our analysis was compiled from procurement documents held
by the SRA. On the basis of these documents, the court order, and interviews with
investigators and analysts at the SCA, the data were divided into two subsets, one
relating to the period when the cartel was active (1995–2001) and the second relating
to the post-cartel period (2004–2009). As it is possible that the companies under
investigation did not directly realize the seriousness of the charges before the first
court order in 2003, data from 2002 and 2003 are excluded.9 Because combinatorial
bidding strategies are substantiallymore complex than those used in standard auctions,
auctions with combinatorial bids are excluded.
In total, the data set contains information on 233 procurements involving 429 con-
tracts and 2130 bids submitted by 58 individual firms. The key variable, bi,c, is the bid
placed by firm i on contract c per square meters of paving at the 2009 price level, in
SEK.10,11 The data set also contains information on the type of procurement proce-
dure applied (direct, negotiated, restricted, open, simplified, informal, or unknown),
the size of the contract measured in square meters of asphalt (Areac), the population
density of the region r in which the contract was procured (Densr ), the number of
bidders on each separate contract (Compc), and region-, year-, and company- spe-
cific fixed effects. These variables are assumed to reflect differences in bi,c resulting
from variation in procurement procedures, economies of scale, production costs,12
market structure, and regional-, annual-, and company-specific effects, respectively.
Descriptive statistics for bi,c, Comp, Area, and Dens are presented in Table 1 below.
The average contract size differs quite substantially between the twoperiods, as does
the population density. This is because several larger projects were procured during
the cartel period, leading to differences in the average bids, bi,c, and Area between
the two periods. The difference in population density is explained by the fact that
during the post-cartel period, no procurements using the standard auction procedure
were conducted in the Stockholm region, which is the most densely populated part of
Sweden (see Table 2 below).
8 Documentation provided by the SCA (2009) suggests that the cartel members met regularly to allocate
the coming year’s contracts and coordinate bidding within their geographical areas. Other firms were com-
pensated for not bidding or for submitting fake bids (complementary bidding) by being granted profitable
subcontracts, free services, or direct monetary transfers. Eventually, the cartel expanded to include almost
every firm operating in the market.
9 This approach was discussed with SCA officials, who agreed that it is reasonable to exclude 2002 and
2003.
10 Ideally, the bids would be measured in tons. However, the information needed for conversion into units
of mass is not available. Because we only consider procurements of relatively non-complex asphalt and
paving works (only surfacing), we believe this to be a minor problem.
11 In 2009, EUR 1 was approximately SEK 10.62 and USD 1 was SEK 7.65.
12 In Sweden, the more densely populated areas are also smaller in geographical terms. During the period
for which we have data, mobile production sites were not frequently used. Therefore, given that asphalt
transportation is costly, Dens is likely to correlate with costs.
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean SD Min. Max.
Whole period
bi,c 1629.8 7683.4 6.19 92,161.5
Comp 5.42 1.50 1 10
Area 52,486 48,129 9630 154,311
Dens 64.52 62.42 3.29 196.9
Observations 2130 Contracts 429
Cartel period 1995–2001
bi,c 1717.2 8036.8 12.1 92,161.5
Comp 5.61 1.47 1 10
Area 42,376 39,473 9,630 154,312
Dens 72.28 63.47 3.30 196.9
Observations 1830 Contracts 353
Post cartel period 2004–2009
bi,c 1096.8 4991.6 6.19 39,300
Comp 4.25 1.07 1 7
Area 114,161 50,202 11,027 154,312
Dens 17.23 22.12 3.29 108.76
Observations 300 Contracts 76
Table 2 Descriptive statistics






Simpli f ied 0.739 0.933




Region1 (North) 0.094 0.540
Region2 (Middle) 0.004 0.153
Region3 (Stockholm) 0.198 0.000
Region4 (Mälardalen) 0.180 0.030
Region5 (West) 0.298 0.200
Region6 (Southeast) 0.122 0.053




The Moran’s I test can either be applied directly on bi,c or on the residuals from a
regression equation such as bi,c = α + βxi,c + εi,c. If the latter approach is adopted,
the statistic becomes conditional on other potentially important determinants of bi,c.
Suppose one wishes to apply the test directly on bi,c. Assume two types of bidders,
A and B, where type A bidders engage in collusive bidding behavior (i.e. they form
a cartel) and type B bidders do not. Define a matrix W of dimension (n × n) with
elements wic, jc such that wi Ac, j Ac > 0, wi Bc, j Bc = wi∗c,i∗c = 0 for all i = j .
Hence, wic, jc > 0 when both i and j are type A firms bidding on the same contract,
otherwise wic, jc = 0. Assume the simplest possible bidding strategy among type A
firms, whereby only one type A bidder places a low bid on a specific contract c while
the rest of type A bidders engage in complementary bidding and place high bids. The
use of this strategy by the actual cartel was suggested in the court order from 2003 and
confirmed in the court order from 2007. To test for complementary bidding among the
cartel members, if firm i A
′
is the cartel member who places the lowest bid on contract
c, then wi A′c, j Ac = 0.13
When applying this test, W is usually row-standardized, so each row-sum of W
















where bi,c and b j,c are bids placed by firms i and j on contract cwith meanμ. The test
statistic is compared to its theoretical mean, E (I ) = −1/ (n − 1), where E (I ) → 0
as n → ∞. The null hypothesis H0 : I = −1/ (n − 1) is tested against the alternative
Ha : I = −1/ (n − 1).
If H0 is rejected, then there are two alternative interpretations depending onwhether
the test statistic I is significantly higher or lower than its expected value. If H0 is
rejected and I > −1/ (n − 1) , a positive spatial correlation is indicated, meaning that
type A firms (other than the one that places the lowest bid) place more similar bids on
a specific contract than would be expected by chance alone. Their bidding behavior is
thus consistent with complementary bidding. If H0 is rejected and I < −1/ (n − 1),
a negative spatial correlation is indicated—that is, type A firms place a mixture of
high and low bids on the same contract. Because the test statistic is compared to its
theoretical mean, inference is often based on the z-statistic
z = [I − E (I )]
SD (I )
(2)
where SD (I ) is the theoretical standard deviation of I .14 If z > |1.98|, I differs
significantly from −1/ (n − 1) at the 95 or a positive spatial correlation.
13 The definition of the elements in the bidding matrix is based on documentation from the SCA (2009),
the court order, and interviews with investigators and analysts at the SCA.
14 For detailed expressions for the theoretical standard deviation, SD (I ), see Cliff and Ord (1972).
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ols1 ols2 ols3 ols4 ols5 ols6
Linear Y N Y Y Y Y Y N




N N N Y Y Y Y Y
Firm specific effects N N N N Y Y Y Y
Regional specific
effects
N N N N N Y Y Y
Time specific effects N N N N N N Y Y
3 Results





the residuals from OLS regressions of different specifications of
bi,c = α + βComp × Compc + βDens × Densr + βArea × Areac
+αp + αt + αr + α f + εicr (3)
where the α’s and β’s are parameters to be estimated, and ε is the error term. The
αp are procurement-specific characteristic dummy variables for direct, negotiated,
restricted, open, simplified, informal and unknown procurement procedures; the αt are
year dummy variables (to capture time trends), the αr are regional dummy variables
(to capture region-specific characteristics), and α f are firm-specific fixed effects (to
capture cost differences across firms).




, and ols1–ols6 are
explained in Table 3 below. For instance, ols1 is a linear specification where αp =
αt = αr = α f = 0. That is, no procurement-, time-, regional-, or firm specific effects
are included, only the explanatory variablesComp, Dens, and Area.15 In ols2,Comp,
Dens, and Area are included together with procurement-specific effects, and ols6 is
a log-linear specification with procurement-, firm-, region-, and year-specific fixed
effects.16
15 Even though we only present values of the Moran’s I statistic based on the residuals for 6 different
specifications of Eq. (3) here, we have performed the test for all possible combinations of procurement,
time, year, and firm-specific effects. The results, which are available from the authors on request, do not
differ from those presented in the paper.
16 The variable Comp is potentially endogenous, making the parameter estimate of βComp in Eq. (3)
biased and inconsistent. However, we lack adequate instruments to apply an IV-estimator, which is also
typically the case for antitrust authorities that are searching for indicators of collusive bidding across many
different procurements and markets. Therefore, we accept the potential bias and inconsistency of βComp ,
a parameter of minor interest in the analysis. However, Moran’s I has also been computed based on the




Table 4 Moran’s I statistics
Model specification Moran’s I
Cartel period 1995–2001 Post-cartel period 2004–2009
bi,c 1.326 (37.444) 0.038 (0.393)
ln(bi,c) 1.104 (30.575) 0.714 (6.317)
ols1 1.325 (37.396) 0.063 (0.628)
ols2 1.325 (37.413) 0.066 (0.654)
ols3 1.331 (37.549) 0.050 (0.496)
ols4 1.313 (37.006) 0.052 (0.516)
ols5 1.314 (37.021) 0.050 (0.492)
ols6 0.941 (26.067) 0.850 (7.515)
z-Statistics within parenthesis
Table 5 Moran’s I statistics based on residuals from a quadratic specification
Model specification Moran’s I
Cartel period 1995–2001 Post-cartel period 2004–2009
ols1 1.318 (37.204) 0.099 (0.963)
ols2 1.319 (37.215) 0.100 (0.970)
ols3 1.327 (37.433) 0.088 (0.853)
ols4 1.303 (36.729) 0.121 (1.156)
ols5 1.295 (36.473) 0.098 (0.931)
z-Statistics within parenthesis
TheMoran’s I statistics for different specifications of Eq. (3) are displayed in Table
4 below. The main result is that the Moran’s I based on the bidding matrix defined
above correctly identifies a significant correlation between bids placed by type A
bidders (i.e. cartel members) during the period when the cartel was active, and rejects
such correlations for the later period when such behavior is unlikely to have occurred.
This result is consistent with complementary bidding and holds for tests based directly
on the bids, bi,c, and for tests based on the residuals, ε, i.e. tests that are conditional on
the other explanatory variables. However, this result is only true for linear models and
not for log-linear specifications of Eq. (3). When based on a log-linear specification,
theMoran’s I statistic indicates complementary bidding among former cartelmembers
even when such behavior is unlikely to exist.
Table 5 displays Moran’s I statistics and corresponding z-values based on the
residuals from different specifications of
bi,c = α + βComp × Compc + βDens × Densr + βArea × Areac
+βComp2 × Comp2c + βDens2 × Dens2r + βArea2 × Area2c
+αp + αt + αr + εicr (4)
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Equation (4) is in some respects less restrictive than a logarithmic specification. The
Moran’s I values based on the residuals fromfive different specifications are displayed
in Table 5 below. For all specifications, the Moran’s I correctly indicates complemen-
tary bidding behavior during the cartel period and rejects such bidding behavior for
the post-cartel period.
Themain conclusion from the results presented in Tables 4 and 5 is that theMoran’s
I correctly predicts complementary bidding behavior for linear and quadratic spec-
ifications when such behavior is likely to exist, and rejects such behavior when it’s
unlikely to be present. The Moran’s I also correctly indicates and rejects complemen-
tary bidding based on information on the separate bids alone.
3.1 How can this technique be applied when the cartel’s identity is unknown?
While the ability to detect complementary bidding among known cartel members is
interesting, the method may also be useful to antitrust authorities looking to screen
many different markets and procurements for suspicious bidding behavior in cases
where the identities of the potential cartel members are unknown. From a practical
point of view, the crucial issue is to reduce the number of likely combinations of firms
to be defined as cartel members. For instance, given a market with a total of 10 firms,
there are 1013 unique combinations of cartel members and hence 1013 different W. If
on top of these combinations we introduce temporal sequencing of bids (which greatly
complicates the analysis), the number of different bidding matrices and the number
of Moran’s I tests to be conducted will increase rapidly. Thus, while it is (at least in
theory) possible to run the test using all possible combinations of definitions of the
elements in the bidding matrix, it is not practical or realistic for antitrust authorities to
do so. It is therefore preferable to take advantage of some prior information/knowledge
or assumptions about potential cartel members and their bidding strategy.17 Therefore,
we outline a four step procedure (the third step of which can be omitted if temporal
sequencing of bids is disregarded) for reducing the set of combinations of colluding
firms and the number of potential bidding strategies within the cartel:
1. Define potential cartel members as the 3 or 4 firms on the market with the highest
turnover or the 3 or 4 most frequent bidders. The focus on the largest firms and/or
the most frequent bidders is motivated by the fact that if they collude, they will
most likely cause more substantial harm to the functioning of a market than would
occur in the event of collusion between small firms that bid on few contracts only.
We thus argue that an antitrust authority with scarce resources should focus on
large firms that place bids on a large proportion of contracts.
2. Construct W based on all possible combinations of these 3 or 4 firms assuming
complementary bidding and that either all firms in the cartel have equal bargaining
power or that their bargaining power is a function of their relative turnover or bid-
ding frequency. Then calculateMoran’s I based on b and, if additional information
17 Prior assumptions regarding bidding strategies is also assumed in previous papers on collusion screens
- for example, see the work of Abrantes-Metz et al. (2006) and Heijnen et al. (2015).
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is available, ε. This reduces the number of unique combinations with at least two
firms involved in the cartel to 11.
3. Construct W based on the above procedure with temporal sequencing of bids and
compute Moran’s I based on both b and ε.
4. If indications of collusive bidding are found, dig deeper into this market to find
accompanying evidence. Otherwise, continue to the next market.
This will dramatically reduce the number of alternative definitions of W and hence
the number of Moran’s I calculations.
4 Concluding remarks
We have evaluated the capacity of the Moran’s I test for spatial correlation to serve
as a tool for detecting potential complementary bidding behavior on public contracts.
The test was applied to bids submitted by the so-called Swedish asphalt cartel, which
was active during the 1990s. Based on data from procurements conducted during the
cartel’s period of activity and after its detection in 2001, the Moran’s I correctly
indicates complementary bidding behavior when such behavior is likely to be present
and rejects such behavior when it’s less likely to exist. On the basis of the results
presented herein and our proposed 4 step procedure, we argue that the Moran’s I
test statistic may be used as a first indicator of complementary bidding behavior by
organizations such as national antitrust authorities. Its main advantage is its relative
simplicity and low data requirements. However, we readily acknowledge that much
more evidence than just a significant Moran’s I value would be required to support
legal proceedings.
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